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Rising Relative Prices or Inﬂ  ation: 
Why Knowing the Difference Matters
Owen F. Humpage
Almost everyone uses the word inﬂ  ation to refer to any increase in prices, but it ought to be reserved for a just one 
kind of price increase. True inﬂ  ation has a different cause—and a different cure—than the price increases of goods 
and services caused by constantly changing supply and demand conditions. The Federal Reserve can and should act 
to control inﬂ  ation, but when relative-price changes are putting pressure on businesses’ balance sheets and consumers’ 
pocketbooks, the Fed can do little. 
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Over the past year, the Federal Reserve has sharply lowered 
its federal funds target rate and taken other policy actions 
to mitigate turmoil in ﬁ  nancial markets and the associated 
downside risks to economic growth. The current federal 
funds target rate is below the rate of inﬂ  ation, a condition 
which suggests that monetary policy is very accommoda-
tive. Some observers have criticized the FOMC for taking 
these policy moves amid growing price pressures. The Fed-
eral Reserve, they complain, has let the inﬂ  ation genie out of 
the bottle and now will have a difﬁ  cult time getting it back in. 
This view, however, is not exactly accurate. The Federal 
Reserve has not lowered interest rates in the midst of inﬂ  a-
tion but rather in the midst of intense global relative-price 
pressures. And there is a very important difference between 
these two characterizations. Central banks can do nothing 
about relative-price changes, but central banks control inﬂ  a-
tion. To be sure, the risks of inﬂ  ation remain substantial in 
the United States at this time, and recent spikes in commod-
ity prices greatly complicate the task of conducting mon-
etary policy, but while the policy cork may be a little loose, 
it’s still stuck in the inﬂ  ation bottle. 
Inﬂ  ation Is a Misused Word
Inﬂ  ation is one of the most misused words in economics. 
As economist Michael Bryan carefully explained a few 
years back, the word originally described currency and 
money, not prices. It referred to a rise in the amount of 
paper currency in circulation relative to the precious metal 
(or money) that backed it. Later, the term referred to the 
amount of money in circulation relative to the amount 
actually needed for trade. Today, however, people typically 
use the word to refer a rise in some set of prices or even in 
a single price, with no necessary connection to money at all. 
So now we have countless types of inﬂ  ation: oil-price inﬂ  a-
tion, healthcare inﬂ  ation, wage inﬂ  ation. The unfortunate 
outcome of this evolution is that the public no longer distin-
guishes between two very different types of price pressure. 
Strictly speaking, inﬂ  ation refers only to a drop in the pur-
chasing power of money that results when a central bank 
creates more money than its public wants to hold. Inﬂ  a-
tion manifests itself as a rise in all prices and wages—not 
just some subset of prices. People, of course, use money to 
conduct their day-to-day transactions, and their demand for 
money generally expands as the economy grows. If the pub-
lic’s demand for money grows at, say, 3 percent per year, but 
the central bank creates money at 5 percent per year, then all 
prices and wages will eventually rise at 2 percent per year. 
Prices will keep climbing as long as the disparity between 
the supply and demand for money continues. 
Inﬂ  ation, as Milton Friedman pointed out, always results 
from a monetary mismatch. It has nothing to do with dwin-
dling supplies of oil or the effects of a terrible hurricane or 
the wage demands of workers. And, as a monetary phenom-
enon, it is always under the control of a central bank. That 
said, the speed with which an inﬂ  ationary monetary impulse 
ﬁ  lters through to all wages and prices depends on many 
things. Most importantly, it depends on the state of people’s 
expectations and the degree of slack in an economy. In times 
when the public generally anticipates inﬂ  ation or when an 
economy is operating at full bore, monetary excesses can 
quickly translate into higher prices and wages. 
Relative-Price Changes Are Not Inﬂ  ation
Relative-price changes, like inﬂ  ation, can cause price pres-
sure in an economy. We experience them every day much 
like we experience inﬂ  ation, and they cause changes in stan-
dard price indexes. But there the similarity ends. Relative-
price changes are not a monetary phenomenon. They arise 
in market economies as individual prices adjust to the ebb 
and ﬂ  ow of the supply and demand for various goods. 
Relative-price movements convey important information 
about the scarcity of particular goods and services. A rising 
relative price indicates that demand is outstripping supply 
(or that supply is falling behind demand), while a falling 
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relative price denotes just the opposite. A rising relative 
price induces consumers to conserve on the good in ques-
tion and to look for substitutes. A rising relative price also, 
by increasing proﬁ  t opportunities, entices producers to bring 
more of the good in question to market. 
In this way, relative-price changes—no matter how uncom-
fortable they are for consumers or producers—transmit vital 
information necessary for the efﬁ  cient allocation of resourc-
es throughout any market economy. Inﬂ  ation, by contrast, 
contributes no information useful to our consumption, 
production, or labor choices. If anything, inﬂ  ation can tem-
porarily distort vital relative-price signals, leading people to 
make unsound economic choices. It can even cause people 
to shift their time and resources away from activities that 
foster production and long-term economic growth to activi-
ties intended to protect their wealth rather than expand it. 
Recently, the relative prices of petroleum, agricultural 
goods, and some other commodities have risen sharply. 
One factor responsible for much of these increases is the 
world’s unprecedented economic performance in recent 
years. Between 2004 and 2007, world output expanded an 
average of 4.8 percent each year, according to International 
Monetary Fund data. While emerging markets, notably 
China and India, appear to have led the way, nearly every 
nation on earth shared in the expansion. This growth and 
development, which itself stems from an increasing willing-
ness of countries to embrace globally integrated markets, 
has placed greater demand on world resources, leading 
to sharp increases in the relative prices of commodities. 
Foods imported into the United States, for example, have 
increased 4 percent on average each year since 2002 relative 
to other goods, while the relative prices of imported indus-
trial commodities have increased 17 percent over the same 
period. Meanwhile, the relative price of petroleum increased 
28 percent each year on average—and because petroleum 
is required to produce food and industrial commodities, its 
hike fed into their prices as well. 
Exchange-Rate Complications
A second factor putting upward pressure on the relative 
prices of many products is the dollar’s depreciation. A dollar 
depreciation raises the dollar price of goods imported into 
the United States. It also lowers the foreign-currency price 
of all dollar-denominated goods, whether they are produced 
in the United States or elsewhere in the world. These two 
price impacts work to shift world demand toward all goods 
denominated in dollars, which then—as simple supply and 
demand reasoning tells us—raises their relative prices. In 
addition, a dollar depreciation reduces the foreign-currency 
purchasing power of those who produce the commodities. If 
they have some power to set prices above what the market 
would otherwise allow—like most oil producers—the dol-
lar’s depreciation may induce them to raise proﬁ  t margins—
which would place even more upward pressure on the dollar 
prices of globally traded commodities. 
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could be a sign of U.S. inﬂ  ation, not of higher relative-price 
pressures. The dollar will depreciate, for example, if the 
Federal Reserve creates an excessive amount of money and 
generates a higher rate of inﬂ  ation in the United States than 
elsewhere. In fact, given the lags of any inﬂ  ationary mon-
etary impulse and the forward-looking nature of exchange 
markets, the dollar may actually depreciate in response to an 
excessive monetary policy before goods prices start to rise. 
But a look at the causes behind the dollar’s recent deprecia-
tion suggests that rising U.S. inﬂ  ation is not a part of it. 
From early 2002 through 2005, the dollar’s depreciation was 
consistent with rising U.S. aggregate demand. Since then, it 
seems to reﬂ  ect international investors’ attempts to diversify 
their portfolios. They are not dumping dollars, but they 
seem to be adding dollars more slowly than other currencies, 
notably euros, to their portfolios. Inﬂ  ation fears do not seem 
to be motivating this portfolio shift, as independent mea-
sures of inﬂ  ation expectations in the United States are not 
rising sharply. In all, a higher rate of inﬂ  ation in the United 
States relative to other major developed countries seems to 
explain only about 6 percentage points out of the dollar’s 
37 percent depreciation since early 2002. The huge remain-
der reﬂ  ects other factors, including relative-price pressures. 
Like inﬂ  ation, relative-price pressures can be fairly broad 
based. Oil and agricultural products enter the produc-
tion of a very wide range of other goods. Like inﬂ  ation, 
relative-price pressures can also be persistent. The dollar 
has depreciated for more than six years, and oil has ratch-
eted up over the last nine. But as long as central banks 
maintain a monetary policy aimed at controlling inﬂ  ation, 
these relative-price pressures and their pass-through to other 
prices will be transitory. As consumers spend more money 
for higher-priced petroleum and agricultural goods, they 
eventually must have less money to spend on other goods 
and services. Other relative prices must then fall, so that 
over the intermediate to long term, the average rate of rising 
prices tends to equal only the underlying inﬂ  ation rate as 
determined by monetary policy. With rising relative prices 
as signiﬁ  cant as those we’ve experienced lately, people’s cost 
of living will surely rise. Their incomes will buy less, and 
their economic well-being will decline. Nevertheless, these 
relative-price pressures, emanating from world growth and 
the dollar’s recent depreciation, do not generate U.S. inﬂ  a-
tion. The Federal Reserve alone does that. 
Monetary Policy
Central banks, through their monetary policies, can con-
trol inﬂ  ation, but they can do nothing about relative-price 
changes, since central banks do not produce oil, wheat, rice, 
or other commodities. Commodity-price shocks do not 
fundamentally impair the ability of central banks to control 
inﬂ  ation, but they can greatly complicate the conduct of 
monetary policy in the short term. For one thing, policymak-
ers often cannot quickly distinguish commodity-price shocks 
from changes in underlying inﬂ  ation trends using standard 
price indexes like the Consumer Price Index (CPI). To han-
dle this problem, economists construct “core” price indexes, 
like the CPI less food and energy or the median CPI, which 
ideally remove relative-price shocks. But even core price 
measures are imperfect over the short term. Commodities 
like oil affect the production and distribution costs of a very 
wide range of other goods and services, and consequently, 
many other prices will also rise in the wake of a commodity-
price shock. 
As ﬁ  gure 1 shows, core inﬂ  ation measures in the United 
States have risen sharply for the past year or so. The Federal 
Reserve must decide whether the pattern presages higher 
inﬂ  ation—if they have eased too much for too long over the 
past year—or, as I suspect, whether it reﬂ  ects the transitory 
echoes of commodity prices into other prices. This is not an 
easy task, and the costs of making an error can be huge. 
In an environment beset with commodity-price shocks, 
where price indexes are difﬁ  cult to interpret, central banks 
require more information to understand any observed price 
pattern. With global markets closely integrated, central 
banks need to understand the underlying reasons for a 
currency depreciation, the expected time frame for pass-
through, and the nature of how people form their inﬂ  ation 
expectations. This, of course, is not necessarily a new bur-
den, but it takes on more urgency. 
Relative-price shocks, even though they are distinct from 
inﬂ  ation, can have an important impact on the public’s 
inﬂ  ation expectations. On a day-to-day basis, consumers 
confront individual prices, not price indexes, and they might 
interpret big changes in speciﬁ  c prices, like gasoline or food 
items, as signals of emerging inﬂ  ation. Relative-price shocks 
might then cause them to change their expectations about 
inﬂ  ation. And when people expect inﬂ  ation, central banks 
can ﬁ  nd achieving and maintaining price stability more difﬁ  -
cult. Any short-term trade-off between inﬂ  ation and growth 
worsens, and as a result, policy responses to economic 
shocks must be bigger. Prices and output can become more 
volatile, particularly in the face of supply shocks. Fortunately, 
wages, which we would expect to respond to inﬂ  ation expec-
tations, have not risen sharply in the United States, nor have 
direct measures of inﬂ  ation expectations (see ﬁ  gures 2 and 3). 
The Federal Reserve has loosened the policy cork over the 
last year in the face of serious relative-price shocks and, 
therefore, still runs the risk of allowing the inﬂ  ation genie 
to escape. Recent relative-price shocks will continue to pass 
through to other prices, but thus far, inﬂ  ation still seems 
fairly well bottled up. 
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